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CASE NOTES
Conflict of Laws-Babcock Doctrine Extended-Section 388 of the New
York Vehicle and Traffic Law Applied to Out-Of-State Accident.-The
defendant lent his car to his brother-in-law in New York for a trip to Florida.
On the way back to New York the brother-in-law was involved in an accident
in North Carolina, in which his wife was killed and his son injured. All parties
were residents of New York, and the car was registered and insured in New
York. The son and the administrator of the wife's estate sued the defendant-
owner of the vehicle for injuries and wrongful death, respectively, under section
388 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law.' The defendant alleged that a
North Carolina statute should be applied.2 The New York Court of Appeals,
holding that New York law applied, gave extra-territorial effect to section 388
of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law3 and section 130 of the New York
Decedent Estate Law,4 involving wrongful death actions.5 The court extended
the doctrine of Babcock v. Jackson0 on the grounds that New York had more
significant contacts with the occurrence than North Carolina and that it would
have been illogical to distinguish the liability of an owner for an out-of-state
accident in a guest-host relationship as determined by Babcock and the liability
for permissive use of a vehicle outside the state. Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d
198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967).
The trend in conflict of laws in tort actions away from the lex loci delic
1. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 388 (formerly N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 59). "Every owner
of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and responsible for death or
injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such
vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the
same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner."
2. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-71.1 (1965). This statute has been construed as a rule of evi-
dence only so that if a jury finds that the use of the vehicle was not for the on ner's
benefit, he is not liable. Mitchell v. White, 256 N.C. 437, 441, 124 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1962).
See also Hartley v. Smith, 239 N.C. 170, 79 S.E.2d 767 (1954). The New York statute,
§ 388 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, provides for liability without regard for the owner's
benefit. Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198, 202, 229 N.E.2d 36, 38, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248, 251
(1967). There was evidence in the instant case that the owner drove the car while in
Florida and thus did benefit, but the court did not choose to decide whether under North
Carolina law, this was sufficient to impose liability. Id. at 202, 229 N.E.2d at 38, 282 N.Y.S.2d
at 251.
3. Prior law had refused to apply § 388 to accidents occurring outside New York.
Selles v. Smith, 4 N.Y.2d 412, 151 N.E.2d 838, 176 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1958) ; Cherwien v. Geiter,
272 N.Y. 165, 5 N.E.2d 185 (1936); Miranda v. Lo Curto, 249 N.Y. 191, 163 N.E. 557
(1928).
4. Now N.Y. E.P.TL. § 5-4.1.
5. 20 N.Y.2d at 204, 229 N.E.2d at 40, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
6. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
7. Naphtali v. Lafazan, 8 N.Y.2d 1097, 171 N.E.2d 462, 209 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1960);
Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 5 N.Y.2d 1016, 158 N.E2d 128, 185 N.Y.S.2d
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theory and toward the "significant contacts" theory began in New York with
Babcock v. Jackson.8 While.the decision has been followed in New York0 and
in other jurisdictions,10 it has generated much discussion as to the nature and
scope of its doctrine."
In Babcock, two New York residents were driving through Ontario, Canada
on a weekend trip when the defendant negligently collided with a stone wall,
injuring the plaintiff. In a suit in New York, the defendant alleged that
Ontario's guest-host statute' 2 barred the plaintiff's recovery. The New York
contacts were the residences of the parties, the place of the inception and
termination of the guest-host relationship, and the registration and insurance
of the vehicle. The court of appeals reviewed New York's strong governmental
interest in avoiding such guest-host statutes'8 and, reasoning by analogy from
a decision in the field of contracts' 4 and relying heavily on the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws,'5 held that the fortuitous occurrence of an accident
268 (1959), modifying, 6 App. Div. 2d 223, 177 N.Y.S.2d 587 (2d Dep't 1958); Poplar v.
Bourjois, Inc., 298 N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948); Kerfoot v. Kelley, 294 N.Y. 288, 62
N.E.2d 74 (1945). See also R. Leflar, The Law of Conflict of Laws 207 (1959).
8. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). See Currie, Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1212,
1233 (1963); Comment, The Aftermath of Babcock, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1301 (1966); 32
Fordham L. Rev. 158 (1963). On the general topic of choice of law in tort actions see
Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better Rule": Threat and Promise in Multistate
Tort Law, 53 Va. L. Rev. 847 (1967).
9. See Glenn v. Advertising Publications, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 889, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 230 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 NX.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965);
Steinberg v. Fishman, 24 App. Div. 2d 457, 260 N.Y.S.2d 403 (2d Dep't 1965); Leonard
v. O'Mara, 22 App. Div. 2d 835, 253 N.Y.S.2d 826 (3d Dep't 1964); Brewi v. Handrich,
45 Misc. 2d 121, 256 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Murphy v. Barron, 45 Misc. 2d 905,
258 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
10. Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967); Reich v. Purcell, 63
Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Myers v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
11. Ehrenzweig, Foreign Guest Statutes and Forum Accidents: Against the Desperanto
of State "Interests," 68 Colum. L. Rev. 49 (1968); Currie, supra note 8; Leflar, Choice-
Influencing Considerations in Conflicts of Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 267 (1966); Comment,
The Aftermath of Babcock, supra note 8; 30 Brooklyn L. Rev. 107 (1963); 32 Fordham L.
Rev. 158 (1963); 77 Harv. L. Rev. 355 (1963); 20 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 79 (1965); 49
Va. L. Rev. 1362 (1963).
12. Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 172, § 105(2) (1960). This statute has recently been amended to
allow recovery for the driver's gross negligence. An Act to Amend the Highway Traffic Act,
1966, 14-15 Eliz. II, ch. 64, § 20(2). Ehrenzweig, supra note 8, hints that Babcock may have
been the reason for the change in the law.
13. 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
14. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
15. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 379(1) (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1963).
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in one jurisdiction should not control the rights of the parties where all the
significant contacts with the occurrence were in another jurisdiction.'0
Before the guidelines set forth in Babcock became enrooted in New York
law, the court of appeals decided Dym v. Gordon.17 Both the plaintiff and the
defendant in Dyrn were New York residents attending summer school in Colo-
rado. They met in Colorado, and the plaintiff was injured when the defendant
negligently collided with another vehicle' s in Colorado while on a short trip
to a golf lesson. In a New York suit, the defendant pleaded a Colorado
guest-host statute,19 which allowed recovery from a host only where the host
was willfully and wantonly negligent.20 The court of appeals, in a 4-3 decision,
held that Colorado law applied and denied recovery because the defendant's
negligence was not "willful and wanton."2' Although the Dyrt court said it
was affirming the Babcock rule and merely applying it,2 2 it actually departed
from it and confused the law of New York. Babcock relied heavily on New
York's public policy aversion to guest-host statutes in applying the significant
contacts testa2 while the Dyrn court specifically stated that such public policy
should "not be treated as 'contacts' which are found then to outweigh the factual
contacts."24 The Dym court, although denying that the situs of the formation
of the relationship alone is controlling25 and stating that the "general intent of
the parties"2 6 should be considered, proceeded to use the situs as the controlling
factor after concluding that the parties intended to have Colorado law apply
to their relationship: "in this case the law of the state in which the parties were
living and in which the relationship was created must be held to be control-
ling."27 The court found a "general intent" to adopt the law of Colorado from
the fact that both parties were "living" in Colorado, although both were domi-
ciled in New York. In placing the emphasis on the situs and the intent, the
court displaced domicile and public policy as prime factors to be considered
in applying the Babcock "contacts" doctrine.28
While writers and attorneys were debating the effect of the Dyn decision on
the Babcock rule,2 9 the court of appeals decided Macey v. Rozbicki,3 0 which
16. 12 N.Y.2d at 484, 191 NZ.2d at 285, 240 N.YS.2d at 752.
17. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
18. The vehicle was operated by a Kansas driver and was registered in Kansas. 16
N.Y.2d at 130, 209 N.E.2d at 798, 262 N.YS.2d at 471 (dissenting opinion).
19. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-9-1 (1963).
20. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-9-1 (1963).
21. 16 N.Y.2d at 120, 209 N.E.2d at 792, 262 N.YS.2d at 463.
22. Id. at 128, 209 N.E.2d at 797, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
23. 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.YS.2d at 750.
24. 16 N.Y.2d at 126, 209 N.E.2d at 796, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
25. Id. at 125, 209 N.E.2d at 795, 262 N.YS.2d at 467.
26. Id., 209 NYE.2d at 795, 262 N.YS.2d at 467.
27. Id. at 128, 209 N.E2d at 797, 262 N.YS.2d at 470.
28. Id. at 127, 209 N.E.2d at 796, 262 N.YS.2d at 468-69.
29. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 8; Comment, The Aftermath of Babcock, supra note 8;
34 Fordham L. Rev. 711 (1966); 20 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 79 (1965).
30. 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.YS.2d 591 (1966).
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somewhat alleviated the confusion. The plaintiff, a New York resident, was
visiting her sister, a New York resident, at the sister's summer home in Canada.
While driving in Canada with her sister, who was driving with the defendant-
owner's permission, the plaintiff was injured through the negligence of the
sister. In a New York suit, the defendant pleaded the Ontario guest-host
statute3 ' as a defense and summary judgment for him was granted and affirmed
in the appellate division on the basis of Dym.3 2 The court of appeals, however,
reasoned that the chance meeting in Dym could be distinguished from the
"planned" meeting in Macey and reversed the lower courts. 33 The fact that in
Macey the trip began and was to end in Canada was termed insignificant by
the court.34
The then Chief Judge Desmond, writing for the majority in Macey, did not
mention New York's governmental interest and public policy against guest-host
statutes.2 5 However, in a concurring opinion in Macey,30 Judge Keating
expressed doubts as to Dym's correctness and advanced his own theory for
deciding Macey in favor of the plaintiff. He reasoned that New York's insurance
laws were designed to protect a New York resident from liability outside the
state and do not make distinctions between guests and other persons. The
policies of New York should therefore control, he concluded, in cases involving
substantial contacts -with New York.3 7
Although the instant case does not mention the governmental interest of
New York, it seems clear that it was considered:
In addressing ourselves to the policy of treating this sort of transitory tort arising
entirely from New York relationships as governed by New York law, there is no
logical basis to distinguish the application . . . of the New York law of liability to
31. Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 172, § 105(2) (1960). This is the same statute as in Babcock.
See note 12 supra.
32. 23 App. Div. 2d 532, 256 N.Y.S.2d 202 (4th Dep't 1965).
33. 18 N.Y.2d at 292, 221 N.E2d at 381-82, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
34. Id., 221 N.E.2d at 381-82, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
35. Perhaps he felt that his and Judge Fuld's recent dissenting opinions in Dym, which
were based on the governmental interest theory toward domiciliaries and the public policy
of New York as set forth in Babcock, covered the subject adequately and did not need
repeating in Macey. 16 N.Y.2d at 134, 209 N.E.2d at 800, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 474 (dissenting
opinion). See also Chief Judge Desmond's concurring opinion in Davenport v. Webb, 11
N.Y.2d 392, 183 NYE.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962), where public policy was considered:
"there is no New York public policy or other bar . . . . " Id. at 395, 183 N.E.2d at 905,
230 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
36. 18 N.Y.2d at 292, 221 N.E.2d at 382, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 593 (concurring opinion).
37. Id. at 293, 221 N.E.2d at 382, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 594 (concurring opinion). In Macey,
both the majority and the concurring opinions failed to note that section 388 of the New
York Vehicle and Traffic Law may have been a bar to the plaintiff's action. Prior to the
instant case and Babcock, § 388 had never been applied to accidents outside New York




gratuitous guests and the New York law of liability arising from permissive use of
a vehicle.38
In comparing the relationship created by the lending of a vehicle and the gra-
tuitous guest relationship, the court seems to be relying on the reasoning in
Babcock that governmental interest and public policy do play an important
part in the choice of law problem. Although the court did not discuss New
York's public policy with respect to the lending of a vehicle, a glance at the
history of the law will show that there is a strong policy for the protection of
persons injured through the lending of a vehicle in New York."
Because the court of appeals reasoned that it would be "highly incongruous
and unreal to have... Babcock apply ... where the victim of the tort is injured
but not where he is killed,140 it applied Pennsylvania law in an action for
wrongful death that occurred when a plane crashed over Maryland.41 All the
significant contacts were with Pennsylvania and the only contact Maryland had
with the occurrence was its chance happening there. The court held that Penn-
sylvania, where the deceased was a resident and where the defendant solicited
business leading to the plaintiff's death,42 had a greater interest in having its
policies of wrongful death upheld. New York's own interest in the wrongful
death of its residents was enunciated in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.'3
where the court refused to apply a limitation on damages in a Massachusetts
wrongful death statute,44 even though the court used this statute as a basis for
recovery. The court based its decision on New York's policy against such limita-
tions in wrongful death actions.45 Therefore, the instant case held that New
York's wrongful death statutes were applicable to deaths occurring outside the
state under the guidelines in Babcock, Kilberg, and Long v. Pan American
World Airways Inc.46 As was done with the decisions that failed to give effect
38. 20 N.Y.2d at 203-04, 229 N.E2d at 39, 282 N.Y.S2d at 252.
39. Section 388 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, which changed the common
law (Miranda v. Lo Curto, 249 N.Y. 191, 163 N.E. 557 (1928)) was enacted to alleviate
the hardship of those injured as a result of the lending of a vehicle in New York to one
without financial responsibility. N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Report, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No.
65(G), p. 593 (1958). To protect the owner of such a vehicle from this new liability, a
provision of the New York Insurance Law, which does not distinguish between in-state
and out-of-state accidents, was amended requiring protection in all automobile poliies
issued in New York. Id. This provision, now in N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(2), was discussed in
Macey without reference to § 388. 18 N.Y.2d at 293, 221 N.E.2d at 382, 274 N.Y.S.2d at
594 (concurring opinion). See note 36 supra.
40. Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 343, 213 N.E.2d 796, 799,
266 N.Y.S.2d 513, 518 (1965).
41. Id. at 343, 213 N.E.2d at 799, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
42. Id. at 341, 213 NE.2d at 798, 266 N.YS.2d at 516.
43. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). But see Davenport v. Webb,
11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962).
44. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 229, § 2 (1955).
45. 9 N.Y.2d at 41-42, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
46. 20 N.Y.2d at 204, 229 N.E.2d at 40, 282 N.YS.2d at 253.
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to section 388 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law outside the state, the
instant court overruled the decisions failing to give New York Decedent Estate
Law section 130 effect outside the state.47
With the court of appeals' open reliance on governmental interest in Long
and its apparent reliance thereon in Macey and in the instant case, it appears that
the statement in Dym that a governmental interest approach is "too provin-
cial" 48 should be disregarded. Moreover, the decision in the instant case sug-
gests a reevaluation of two recent New York cases, Fornaro v. Jill Bros., Inc.40
and Davenport v. Webb.r°
In Fornaro, the plaintiff's decedent, a five year old boy, was killed while
riding in the defendant corporation's car in New Jersey. The car, which was
registered and customarily used in New Jersey, was being driven with the
defendant's permission on a personal shopping trip. Both the decedent and the
defendant corporation were New York residents. The decedent had arrived at
the defendant's New Jersey property the night before the accident and had
begun the trip in New Jersey. The appellate division5' ruled, without extensive
analysis, that New Jersey had more contacts with the occurrence than did New
York and applied New Jersey law.52 Analysis was not really necessary because,
as the court pointed out, section 388 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law,
the statute invoked in the case, had no application to accidents outside the
state.53 The court of appeals, in a short opinion, affirmed the appellate division
and noted that there was evidence that the property in New Jersey was a
truck farm operated by the defendant and the driver of the car was a resident
of the farm.54 While New Jersey had greater quantitative contacts, New York
had significant qualitative contacts such as the domicile of the parties and the
policy of protecting those injured as a result of the lending of a vehicle to one
without financial responsibility.55 The weight to be given to this policy has not
been fully announced in the cases to date,56 and, therefore, the Fornaro decision
47. See note 3 supra.
48. 16 N.Y2d at 126, 209 N.E.2d at 796, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
49. 22 App. Div. 2d 695, 253 N.Y.S.2d 771 (2d Dep't 1964), aff'd mem., 15 N.Y.2d
819, 205 N.E.2d 862, 257 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1965).
50. 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962).
51. 22 App. Div. 2d 695, 253 N.Y.S.2d 771 (2d Dep't 1964).
52. Under New Jersey law, the permittee must be on the owner's business before the
owner will be liable for his negligence. Ruchlin v. A.G. Motor Sales Corp., 127 N.J.L. 378,
22 A.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Spelde v. Galtieri, 102 N.J.L. 203, 130 A. 526 (Ct. Er. &
App. 1925).
53. 22 App. Div. 2d at 696, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 773-74. See cases cited in note 3 supra.
54. 15 N.Y.2d at 820, 205 N.E.2d at 862, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
55. See note 39 supra.
56. See cases cited in note 3 supra. The general policy of New York with respect to
the protection of those injured in automobile accidents can be found in N.Y. Vch. & Traf.
Law § 310(2), however, this section is primarily an introduction to the mandatory insurance
provisions of New York and not a statement of policy with respect to the lending of a
vehicle. See Duprey v. Security Mut. Cas. Co., 43 Misc. 2d 811, 252 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Sup.
Ct. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 22 App. Div. 2d 544, 256 N.Y.S.2d 987 (3d Dep't 1965).
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may be sound. However, should a situation with slightly different quantitative
contacts arise, the court may feel compelled by the policy behind section 388 to
apply New York law.
In Davenport, which was decided before Babcock, the plaintiff's decedent
was killed in an automobile crash in Maryland. The plaintiff sued in New York
for wrongful death and recovered under Maryland law.1 The court did not
include prejudgment interest because the Maryland statute did not provide for
it.58 The plaintiff alleged that the court should have awarded such interest based
on sections 130-32 of the New York Decedent Estate Law, relying on Kilberg
to support a departure from the law of Maryland. The court of appeals held
that no prejudgment interest should be awarded because the "damages for a tort
[are] ... governed by the law of the place where the wrong occurred ... [and]
interest ... is 'part of the damages' [and, we will not add] interest . . unless
lex loci delictus authorizes such an addition."00 In addition, the court stated
that New York Decedent Estate Law section 13201 must be read with New York
Decedent Estate Law sections 130-31 which have not been given effect to
deaths occurring outside the state.62 In the future, under the Babcock rule, the
law of New York would be applied to these facts where New York has the most
significant relationship with the issue presented,Oa and the instant case would
allow New York Decedent Estate Law sections 130-3204 to be applied, even
though the death occurred outside the state. Therefore, should facts similar to
Davenport occur again, there will be a different result.60
The emphasis on the quantitative contacts such as residence, place of the
formation of the relationship, and time spent in a jurisdiction will continue to
See also Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 995, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647, 650-51 (Sup. CL 1965),
afrd, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (3d Dep't 1966), which discusses New York's
interest in § 388.
57. 15 App. Div. 2d 42, 222 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1st Dep't 1961).
58. Id. at 43, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 567. See Md. Ann. Code art. 67 (1957).
59. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law §§ 130-32.
60. 11 N.Y.2d at 393-94, 183 N.E.2d at 903, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 18-19 (citations omitted).
61. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 132 (now N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 5-4,3).
62. 11 N.Y.2d at 395, 183 N.E.2d at 904-05, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 20; Murmann v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R. Co., 258 N.Y. 447, 180 N.E. 114 (1932).
63. The opinions of the courts in Davenport do not reveal the extent of the contacts with
New York. In Dym, the court mentions that domicile of the parties was the only New
York contact in Davenport. 16 N.Y.2d at 128, 209 N.E2d at 797, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 470. The
analysis in the text is based on the assumption that there ill be enough contacts with New
York to allow New York law to be applied.
64. Now, N.Y. E.P.T.L. §§ 5-4.1-4.3.
65. One federal court has reasoned that the New York Court of Appeals would not
reverse Davenport v. Webb on the strength of Babcock alone because the statute which
gives rise to the cause of action should determine the damages and interest. Berner v.
British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 230 F. Supp. 240, 245-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
Section 388 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law may now give rise to the cause of




be used as contacts, as will governmental interests and public policy.00 With
the extension of Babcock to New York's wrongful death and permittee statutes
in the instant case, it appears that the significant contacts test will continue to
expand and that decisions such as Dyrn, which limit it, will become increasingly
unimportant.
Constitutional Law-Illegitimate Children Denied Equal Protection of
Laws.-Three indigent mothers applying to Prince George's County, Maryland,
Welfare Department for aid to their illegitimate children, revealed in answer to
Department questions that they had a total of eight illegitimate children (five
Negro and three Caucasian1 ). The Welfare Department required that the
mothers provide the State's Attorney with information about the fathers which
might enable the state to recover support money. 2 On the basis of the informa-
tion given by the mothers, criminal neglect proceedings were commenced against
two of them,3 and civil proceedings were brought under a Maryland statute to
declare the children "neglected" because they were "living in a home which fails
to provide a stable moral environment." 4 The statute provides five criteria to
66. The weight given to New York's public policy is emphasized by Kell v. Henderson,
47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d
552 (3d Dep't 1966), where the court was faced with the converse of the Babcock facts:
two Ontario residents were driving through New York on a weekend trip when the plaintiff
was injured through the negligence of the defendant. The court held that Babcock did not
apply because a plaintiff injured in New York has a cause of action notwithstanding his
residence or contacts with another jurisdiction. Id., 263 N.Y.S.2d at 647. The correctness of
this decision is doubtful even in light of New York's strong policies. See Rosenberg, An
Opinion for the New York Court of Appeals, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 459 (1967); Trautman,
A Comment, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 465 (1967).
1. Letter from Arthur A. Marshall, State's Attorney for Prince George's County, Mary-
land, to Fordharn Law Review, January 2, 1968.
2. See Md. Ann. Code art. 88A, § 5A (Supp. 1967).
3. People v. C., JA-7382, 7383 (Prince George's County Cir. Ct., Md., filed May 24, 1967)
in 9 Welfare L. Bull. 6 (July, 1967); People v. P., JA-7386, 7387, 7388 (Prince George's
County Cir. Ct., Md., filed May 24, 1967) in 9 Welfare L. Bull. 6 (July, 1967).
4. Md. Ann. Code art. 26, § 52(f) (6) (1966). The statute defines a "neglected child" as a
"child (1) who is without proper guardianship; (2) whose parent, guardian or person with
whom the child lives, by reason of cruelty, mental incapacity, immorality or depravity, is
unfit to care properly for such a child; (3) who is under unlawful or improper care, super-
vision, custody or restraint, by any person, corporation, agency, association, institution or
other organization or who is unlawfully kept out of school; (4) whose parent, guardian or
custodian neglects or refuses, when able to do so, to provide necessary medical, surgical,
institutional or hospital care for such child; (5) who is in such condition of want or suffering,
or is under such improper guardianship or control, or is engaged in such occupation as to
injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others; or (6) who is living in a home
which fails to provide a stable moral environment. In determining whether such stable moral
environment exists, the court shall consider, among other things, whether the parent, guardian,
or person with whom the child lives (i) Is unable to provide such environment by reasons
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determine "whether such stable moral environment exists; "I the court held that
these children were "neglected" solely because their mothers had given birth
to more than one illegitimate child.6 In re B.C., JA-7384 (Prince George's County
Cir. Ct. Md., Sept. 21, 1967), appeal docketed, Md. Ct. App. No. 353, 1967
Term.
The court's declaration that these children were neglected and therefore sub-
ject to removal to the custody of the Welfare Department,- solely because their
mothers had given birth to more than one illegitimate child, was an improper
interpretation of the relevant statute. This statute provides that in determining
whether a "stable moral environment exists, the court shall consider among other
things," five factors 8 In the context of the statute the phrase "among other
things" requires a detailed inquiry as to whether the mother in question and her
home are fit for the rearing of children. In this case there was no showing that
these children were actually neglected; there was merely a showing of the
existence of illegitimate children in the family.9 The bill, as originally proposed,
provided that "lack of a stable moral environment" would be "prima facide"
established by the five criteria listed.' 0 Before the statute was enacted, "prima
facie" was stricken and "among other things" substituted."1 This seems to be a
legislative mandate against declaring "neglect" based on a finding that one of
the listed criteria was met.' 2
of immaturity or emotional, mental or physical disability; (ii) Is engaging in promiscuous
conduct inside or outside the home; (iii) Is cohabiting with a person to whom he or she is
not married; (iv) Is pregnant with an illegitimate child; or (v) Has, within a period of
twelve months preceding the filing of the petition alleging the child to be neglected, either
been pregnant with or given birth to another child to whose putative father she was not
legally married at the time of conception, or has not thereafter married." Aid. Ann. Code
art. 26, § 52(f) (1966).
5. Md. Ann. Code art. 26, § 52(f)(6)(i)-(v) (1966).
6. The court "consider[ed] this case on these facts: That these women have conducted
themselves in such a way that they have brought into the world more than one illegitimate
child, that those children are now living together with their mother under the same roof,
or in the same group unit.
"Now the question to be decided is whether or not on that set of minimum facts, The
Court can find that they are neglected within the meaning of the Maryland law." Record at
106-07, In re B.C., JA-7384 (Prince George's County Cir. Ct., Md., Sept. 21, 1967) [here-
inafter cited as Record]. The court considered no other facts.
7. Md. Ann. Code art. 26, § 61 (1966). However, in the instant case the children were
left in their homes. Record at 113.
8. Md. Ann. Code art. 26, § 52(f) (6) (1966) (emphasis added).
9. Record at 81.
10. Maryland Legislative Council Report to the General Assembly 55 (1963) (emphasis
added).
11. Ch. 723, § 1, [1963] Laws of Aid. 1510.
12. Birth of an illegitimate child, by itself, was an insufficient reason for modifying a
divorce decree to remove minor children from their mother's custody in two cases decided
by the Appellate Court of Illinois. The court implied that other factors, particularly the care
that a mother gives her child, should be considered. Jayroe v. Jayroe, 58 111. App. 2d 79, 82,
206 N.E.2d 266, 268 (1965); Brown v. Brown, 13 Ill. App. 2d 56, 140 N.E.2d 528 (1957).
1968]
792 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36
Moreover, this statute, as interpreted, appears to be a denial of equal pro-
tection of law to an arbitrarily selected class of the population. The fourteenth
amendment 8 prohibits the states from discriminating against classes of its
citizens for reasons that are "invidious,'1 4 "arbitrary, oppressive or capricious,
and made to depend upon differences of color, race, nativity, religious opinions,
[or] political affiliations . . . ."15 Statutes which violate the equal protection
clause generally fall into two classes: those which are discriminatory on their
face, and those which discriminate through their administration."0
On its face the Maryland statute distinguishes between homes which have
more than one illegitimate child and homes in which the children are legitimate.17
Illegitimacy, by itself, may or may not be a valid basis upon which to base a
statutory classification.' s A statute which would deny people born out of wed-
lock the right to vote would clearly be unconstitutional. Intestate succession
based upon the legitimacy-illegitimacy dichotomy, however, is a proper matter
for statutory consideration.'0 Illegitimacy appears to be a valid factor which,
along with other factors, may constitutionally be considered as an indication of
the moral environment of a home.
In effect, the present administration of the Maryland statute arbitrarily classi-
fies children who are prospective welfare recipients as illegitimate and legitimate,
in order to lessen the taxpayer's welfare burden.2 0 The declaration that the chil-
dren are neglected will not automatically reduce the welfare rolls.21 However,
the Maryland State Department of Public Welfare is distributing a statement
to prospective welfare applicants advising them of the result of the instant case
-that information divulged to the State's Attorney can result in illegitimate
children being declared "neglected" and removed from their parent's custody.22
13. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
15. American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900).
16. Compare Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), with Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339 (1879).
17. Md. Ann. Code art. 26, § 52(f) (6) (v) (1966).
18. One commentator has questioned whether legislation may constitutionally distinguish
between children born out of wedlock and those born in wedlock. Krause, Equal Protection
for the Illegitimate, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 477, 483 (1967).
19. E.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 93, § 150 (1964); N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 4-1.2.
20. While only 17.0 per cent of the population of Maryland is non-white, 77.4 per cent
of families receiving aid for dependent children are non-white. Maryland State Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, A Report on Caseload Increase in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Program, 1960-1966, at 17 (1967).
21. See Md. Ann. Code art. 88A, § 48(b) (3) (1964).
22. Maryland State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, Statement, Legal Action for Support From
Absent Fathers-Special Situation in Prince George's County (Oct., 1967).
In the instant case the mothers's motion to intervene was denied. Record at 10. This
denial was clearly erroneous. The interest of a mother in her child, although not a property
right, Fischer v. Meader, 95 N.J.L. 59, 111 A. 503 (Sup. Ct. 1920), can be considered to
transcend property rights. Denton v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 193 P. 307 (1920). This interest
is more than a mere privilege, revocable by the state, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
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A needy mother of illegitimate children is confronted with an undesirable di-
lemma. Either she will apply for welfare and risk losing her "neglected" children
or not apply for welfare. Fear of losing custody of her children will certainly
tend to dissuade a mother from applying for aid to her illegitimate children?2
The great majority of the illegitimate children who, as potential welfare recipi-
ents, might be affected by the instant decision are non-white..2 4 Whereas only
22.3 per cent of all children born to Maryland residents in 1965 are non-white,
79.5 per cent of illegitimate children born into families which already had one
illegitimate child were non-white.2
Although the Negro-white ratio in the instant action approximates that of the
illegitimate population of Maryland, 26 it is conceivable that the discriminatory
administration of the instant statute will ultimately be directed primarily against
Negroes. Certainly the State's Attorney was aware that the present case is a
test case27 since the statute had not previously been interpreted. Presentation of
510 (1925), and should not be interfered with except in the most extraordinary circumstances.
Fritts v. Krugh, 354 Mich. 97, 92 N.W.2d 604 (1958) ; Larson v. Larson, 30 Wis. 2d 291, 140
N.W.2d 230 (1966). Consequently, this interest cannot be taken away without due process
of law, People ex rel. Lentino v. Feser, 195 App. Div. 90, 186 N.Y.S. 443 (1st Dep't 1921) ;
DeWitt v. Brooks, 143 Tex. 122, 182 S.W.2d 687, cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862 (1944), which
requires that the parents be given an opportunity to be heard in opposition to the proceeding.
Creely v. Olvera, 70 Cal. App. 2d 186, 160 P.2d 870 (1945); Sinquefield v. Valentine, 159
Miss. 144, 132 So. 81 (1931).
23. This fear should also operate to deter a white woman from seeking aid for her
illegitimate children. See note 24 infra and accompanying text. The Negro family is normally
dominated by a matriarch. Bureau of Pub. Assistance, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, Illegitimacy and its Impact on the Aid to Dependent Children Program 15 (1960).
Moreover, the Negro moral code regards the tie between a mother and her child as most
sacred and not easily severed. Id.
24. Illegitimate children born to Maryland residents numbered 8,800 in 1965. These
included 2,493 white children and 6,307 non-white. Division of Biostatistics, Md. State
Dep't of Health, Annual Vital Statistics Report-Maryland, 1965, at 20 (1966).
25. Calculations based upon data appearing in note 24 supra at 21, table 21.
The disproportionate number of non-white illegitimate children would not of itself
necessitate a finding that equal protection is violated. See Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry,
297 U.S. 422, 429 (1936). The fourteenth amendment does not require that things which
are different be treated alike, Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966) ; Tigner v. Texas,
310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the La%,ws, 37
Calif. L. Rev. 341, 344 (1949), but rather it requires "that those who are similarly situated
be similarly treated." Id. Although Negroes have a higher crime rate than whites, President's
Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Crime and
its Impact-An Assessment 78 (1967), the indiscriminate application of criminal statutes
to crime feasors is not unconstitutional. A criminal statute, however, applied only against
Negroes would fall within the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment. McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
26. In the instant case five of the eight children declared "neglected" are of the Negro
race. Letter from Arthur A. Marshall, State's Attorney for Prince George's County Maryland,
to Fordham Law Review, January 2, 1968. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
27. It was "obvious" to the instant court that this is a test case. Record at 105.
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an "integrated" test group of defendants would facilitate judicial approval of a
statute which is of questionable validity.28 The inclusion of the three white
children in the instant action can be viewed as "reverse token integration" to
mask the true nature of the discriminatory application of the statute. A second
"neglect" action is now pending before the Circuit Court for Prince George's
County. Each of the eight children involved is of the Negro race.29
In the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,30 an ordinance which prohibited the
maintenance of a laundry in buildings which were not constructed of stone or
brick, without the consent of a board of supervisors, had been enacted in San
Francisco. Although it was claimed that the city had power to "make... regula-
tions for protection against fire," 3' the United States Supreme Court observed
that 240 of the 320 laundries in San Francisco were owned by Chinese and that
310 of the 320 laundries were constructed of wood. Whereas 200 Chinese pro-
prietors had been denied permission to operate laundries in wooden structures,
only one non-Chinese owner was similarly denied permission. Additionally, while
150 Chinese were arrested for carrying on business without permission, 80
Caucasians had been left unmolested. The Court found an ulterior motive-
elimination of Chinese laundries from competition with Occidental laundries.82
Although the law was impartial and fair on its face, it had been administered
"so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in
similar circumstances, material to their rights" and therefore falls "within the
prohibition of the Constitution." 33
Clearly, the Maryland statute affects primarily people of the Negro race.
However, reliance on Yick Wo as authority for holding the instant statute un-
constitutional, as affecting a racial discrimination, would be premature at this
point. An insufficient number of individuals have been the subject of litigation
to demonstrate conclusively a purely racial discrimination. The instant case
raises an interesting question of whether minority groups must wait until there
is proof of systematic discrimination in the enforcement of a racially suspect
statute.
Judge Bowen, in the instant case, required the mothers to study, understand
and practice methods of birth control "at the risk of loosing [sic] their chil-
dren,"'34 who were left in their homes pending appeal.35 Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,3 6 which declared unconstitutional a Connecticut statute37 prohibiting use
28. See notes 7-12 and 16-23 supra and accompanying text.
29. Letter from Arthur A Marshall, State's Attorney for Prince George's County Mary-
land, to Fordham Law Review, November 15, 1967.
30. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
31. Id. at 360.
32. Id. at 362.
33. Id. at 374.
34. Record at 115. It is strange that the mothers were denied permission to intervene,
id. at 10, but were required to practice birth control. See note 22 supra. The Judge seems
to condone promiscuity so long as it does not cost the State any money.
35. Record at 113.
36. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
37. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-32 (1958).
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of any contraceptive, at the same time affirmed a right to voluntary family
planning.as Justice Goldberg stated that if "a law outlawing voluntary birth
control... is valid, then, by the same reasoning, a law requiring compulsory
birth control also would seem to be valid." 9 Just as the law prohibiting volun-
tary birth control was declared unconstitutional, it follows that administering a
law so as to require compulsory birth control is also unconstitutional.
Benefits to needy children have traditionally been considered governmental
charity,40 to which the recipient has no vested interest.41 Under this theory,
governmental grants may be denied or revoked at the discretion of the "donor."
42
However, because of the complexity of today's technological society, more people
have become dependent upon public assistance. It should be a national objective
to provide public assistance to all who cannot provide for themselves. 3 To
further this goal it has been argued that governmental assistance to the needy
should be considered a right governed by a system of laws comparable to that
surrounding traditional rights, rather than a mere privilege to be given or taken
away at the whim of some public official.44 Denial of public assistance, in conse-
quence, should not be viewed simply as the denial of a privilege, but as the denial
of a right, which is protected by constitutional safeguards. The decision in the
instant case is a step backward from the goal that "no American will go vithout
the minimum necessities of life." 45
Constitutional Law-Intergovernmental Immunities-National Bank
Held Subject to State Sales and Use Taxes.-Plaintiff, a national banking
association organized under a Federal statute,' and doing business in Massachu-
setts, sought a ruling exempting it from state sales and use taxes* imposed on
purchases of personal property made for the bank's own use. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the national bank was not exempt
but was subject to the state sales and use taxes. First Agricultural .National
38. Pilpel, Birth Control and a New Birth of Freedom, 27 Ohio St. L.J. 679 (1966).
39. 381 U.S. at 497 (concurring opinion).
40. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733, 734 (1964); Comment, Withdrawal
of Public Welfare: The Right to a Prior Hearing, 76 Yale L.J. 1234 (1967).
41. Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 166 (1895).
42. United States v. Teller, 107 U.S. 64, 68 (1882).
43. Newsweek, Nov. 20, 1967, at 65.
44. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 143, 144-54
(1958) ; Reich, supra note 40, at 785-86.
45. Newsweek, Nov. 20, 1967, at 65 (emphasis deleted).
1. 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1964).
2. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 14, § 1(6), § 2(5)(b) (1966). The amount of these taes totaled
$575.66 during the period from April 1, 1966, to June 30, 1966. First Agricultural Nat'l
Bank v. State Tax Commission, - Mass. -, 229 N.E.2d 245, (1967), prob. juris. noted,
88 Sup. Ct. 774 (1968).
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Bank v. State Tax Commission, - Mass. -, 229 N.E.2d 245 (1967), prob.
juris. noted, 88 S. Ct. 774 (1968).3
The principle of implied tax immunity for government agencies and instru-
mentalities was enunciated in the landmark cases of M'Cullock v. Maryland and
Osborn v. Bank of The United States.4 In both cases Chief Justice Marshall
reasoned that since the national banks are fiscal agents of the United States,
they cannot be taxed for to do so would be to tax the Sovereign itself.5 In
M'Cullock, the national banks were compared with the judicial process, the
national mint, the postal service and the custom house." Noting that the power
to tax involves the power to destroy, the Chief Justice reasoned that these
functions of the federal government demanded immunity from state taxation.7
Marshall's reasoning has since been questioned,8 but the principle of govern-
mental immunity from state taxation has not been repudiated. 9 Marshall o and
later Justices" spoke of it as constitutional immunity. While M'Culloch and
Osborn dealt with discriminatory taxes, the Court in Owensboro National Bank
v. Owensboro,12 held that a non-discriminatory franchise tax was void because
3. New York's highest court has also recently held that the national banks in New York
are not exempt from its sales and use taxes. Like the Massachusetts court, the court of
appeals in New York emphasized the similarity between the national banks and the state
banks and refused to follow M'Culloch v. Maryland, claiming that the holding is obsolete.
Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Buscaglia, 21 N.Y.2d 357, 235 N.E.2d 101, 288 N.Y.S.2d
33 (1967) (mem.).
4. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 326 (1824). The doctrine of tax
immunity as stated by Marshall was referred to by Mr. Justice Frankfurter as a "web of
unreality . . . [which] withdrew from the taxing power of the States and Nation a very
considerable range of wealth without regard to the actual workings of our federalism .... "
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 490 (1939) (concurring opinion).
5. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400-25 (1819); Osborn v. Bank
of The United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 326, 380 (1824).
6. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 431.
7. Id.
8. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 490 (1939) (concurring
opinion); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (dissenting
opinion).
9. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355 (1966); United States v.
Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 44 (1964); Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 122 (1954).
10. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 426.
11. United States v. Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316
U.S. 481, 485 (1942) (imnunity comes from the Constitution or federal statutes);
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 480 (1939).
12. 173 U.S. 664, 667-68 (1899). Owensboro is indicative of the growth of tax immunity
for government activities throughout the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth
century. In recent years, however, there has been a trend towards curtailing immunities
from state taxes for government activities. Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n,
318 U.S. 261, 270 (1943). See Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities,
58 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (1945). For example, states have been allowed to tax government
contractors even though the burden of the tax falls upon the United States, as long as
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it was imposed upon the property of the national bank and not upon its shares, as
explicity permitted by Congress. 13 With M'Czdloch standing for the proposition
that the Government cannot be taxed without its permission, it has been as-
sumed that the national banks share in this immunity and thus cannot be taxed
without congressional consent.' 4 When the national banks were re-established
in 1863, it was accepted that the states could not tax them in the absence of a
federal statute:1 5 "[T]he error of not conferring the power to tax, early im-
pressed itself upon Congress; for the following year . . . power was granted to
States . . . to tax the shares of stock in the names of the shareholders.""' In
1864, Congress enacted R.S.5219.17 In Owensboro18 the Court held that this
statute was the exclusive means by which the operations of the national banks
may be taxed, and since then the Court has assumed this statute to be exclu-
sive.' 9 However, the principle that this statute stands at the outer limits of
the legal incidence of the tax does not fall upon the Government itself. Kern-Limerick, Inc.
v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954); Alabama v. King & Boczer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941); Curry
v. United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134
(1937). Also, the states have been allowed to tax the salaries of employees of the federal
government. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466. 475 (1939). More recently,
there have been a number of Supreme Court decisions which have indicated that private
enterprises rendering a service to the Government are not immune from state taxation.
United States v. Boyd, 378 US. 39 (1964) ; United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958);
Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958). See Van Cleve, States' Rights and Federal
Solvency, 1959 Wis. L. Rev. 190.
13. Rev. Stat. § 5219 (1923), as amended, 44 Stat. § 223 (1926), 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1964).
14. "[Slince the power to create the agency includes the implied power to do whatever
is needful or appropriate, if not expressly prohibited, to protect the agency, there has been
attributed to Congress some scope . . . for granting or withholding immunity of federal
agencies from state taxation." Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 US. 466, 478 (1939).
When Congress legislates within its constitutional powers its acts are supreme and, therefore,
the validity of state taxation of a government activity must depend upon (a) the power of
Congress to create the activity and (b) the intent of Congress to have the activity remain
immune from state taxation. This intent may be implied. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 US.
405, 411 n.1 (1938).
15. Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro, 173 US. 664, 668 (1899).
16. Id.
17. Rev. Stat. § 5219 (1923), as amended, 44 Stat. § 223 (1926), 12 US.C. § 548
(1964), provides in pertinent part:
"The legislature of each State may determine and direct, subject to the provisions of this
section, the manner and place of taxing all the shares of national banking associations
located within its limits. The several States may (1) tax said shares, or (2) include divi-
dends derived therefrom in the taxable income of an owner or holder thereof, or (3) tax
such associations on their net income, or (4) according to or measured by their net income,
provided the following conditions are complied with:
1. (a) The imposition by any State of any one of the above four forms of taxation shall
be in lieu of the others .... "
18. 173 U.S. 664, 667-68 (1899).
19. See Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Michigan, 365 US. 467, 472 (1961), where the Court
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state power to tax the national banks rests upon the premise that the national
banks still share in the immunity of the Government. In denying this premise, the
instant court reasoned that since the national banks have grown into commercial
banks very much similar to the state-chartered banks, they are enjoying a com-
petitive advantage over their state counterparts because of their immunity.2 0
However, while the national banks enjoy an advantage due to R.S.5219, the
Supreme Court has allowed the states to tax the shares of the net income of the
national banks at a rate eight times as high as that imposed on state banks'
shares on the ground that the resulting tax on the national banks represented a
smaller percentage of the capital employed by these banks than the tax on state
banks represented in respect to the capital employed by these institutions. 21
It may be safe to assume that the operations of the Government itself, or one
of its agencies,22 may not be taxed-at least in the absence of congressional
consent-but it is another thing to suggest that every agency created by Con-
gress, insofar as it performs a service for the federal government, enjoys the
same immunity. While the Supreme Court has said that an "instrumentality"
is immune from state taxation unless Congress consents to its being taxed, 2"
the term "instrumentality" has been used to describe a privately owned agency
performing a service for the Government. Such an agency, moreover, has been
held immune from state taxation.2 4 Classifying a government activity as an
"instrumentality" does not, ipso facto, confer tax immunity. The label, "instru-
mentality," is confusing and deceptive. Recently, the Court has been called
upon to determine the status of the National Red Cross and the Army Post
Exchanges in Department of Employment v. United States25 and Standard
Oil Company v. Johnson .2  In the Department of Employment case the Court
noted that R.S. 5219 had been passed on by the Supreme Court fifty-five times without
ever indicating that this statute was not exclusive.
20. - Mass. -, 229 N.E.2d 245, 258 (1967), prob. juris. noted, 88 Sup. Ct. 774 (1968).
21. Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Michigan, 365 U.S. 467 (1961). As a result of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of R.S. 5219 in this case, some bankers believe that the national
banks which are taxed by the fourth method allowed by the statute are discriminated
against, and there have been suggestions that this section be amended to allow tile states
to tax the personal property of the national banks rather than to permit the states to tax
the national banks at a built-up rate. National Banks and The Future: Report of the
Advisory Committee on Banking to the Comptroller of the Currency 173 (1962).
22. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954); United States v. Allegheny, 322
U.S. 174 (1944) ; Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
23. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358 (1966). Graves v.
New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 479 (1939); Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro,
173 U.S. 664, 667-68 (1899); Osborn v. Bank of The United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
326 (1824); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
24. United States v. Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486-87 (1958).
25. 385 U.S. 355 (1966).
26. 316 U.S. 481 (1942). In Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954), the
Court ruled that a tax whose legal incidence fell upon the Navy Department was unconsti-
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found the American National Red Cross immune from Colorado's unemployment
compensation tax, and in Johnson, it invalidated a privilege tax which California
sought to impose on the distribution of fuel at the United States Army post
exchanges. In both cases, the Court noted that the institutions sought to be
taxed, the American Red Cross and the post exchanges, are regulated exten-
sively by the federal government, that both received government subsidies;'
and that the initial authority of each is given by Congress.28 In addition, the
Court seemed to be impressed by the fact that the Government exercises a
large measure of control over both agencies, the President appointing the chief
administrators of the Red Cross and the post exchanges being operated and
administered by the officers of the Armed Services.- But beyond all these fac-
tors the Court found, as apparently the most significant factor, that both in-
stitutions were vital to the execution of a specific governmental function and
were properly characterized as an "arm of the Government."3 0
Prior to the Red Cross case, Mr. Justice Black had indicated in United
States v. Huskegon,31 that if an institution is so controlled and regulated by
Government so as to be assimilated into the Government it shares the Govern-
ment's immunity as a "servant" of the Government. Six years later, in United
States v. Boyd,32 contractors working for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
Union Carbide and H. K. Ferguson Company, sought to remove Tennessee sales
and use taxes on the theory that the purchases were made for the benefit of the
Government (AEC) and hence could not be subjected to a state tax. The Court
held that the legal incidence of the tax was upon the contractors and not the
AEC.33 Citing the "servant" guideline, used by Justice Black in Muskegon,
the Government urged that the contractors were so "'assimilated by the Govern-
ment as to become one of its constituent parts.' ,,34 The Court accepted this guide-
line, but nevertheless held that since the AEC could have used its own employees
to perform the same functions for which Union Carbide and Ferguson had
contracted, Union Carbide and Ferguson did not become so assimilated into the
tutional. The Court did not attempt to set out any standards for determining when a
government function is immune, but merely said that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
so imbedded in constitutional history that it does not need elaboration. Id. at 122.
27. 385 U.S. at 359; 316 U.S. at 484.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 385 U.S. at 359-60; 316 U.S. at 485.
31. 355 U.S. 484, 486 (1958). The United States owned a plant in Muskegon which
Continental Motors Corporation used while performing several contracts for the Govern-
ment. Continental agreed to deduct the price of rent from its costs. The corporation was
taxed for the use of the tax-exempt property in its business, and it claimed that it was
immune from this tax because the tax was upon government property. The Court held that
Continental had to pay the tax because it was using the property in its own commercial
activities.
32. 378 US. 39 (196t).
33. Id. at 44.
34. Id. at 46-47 (citation omitted).
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Government as to obtain tax exemption.85 The Court implied, however, that
had Carbide and Ferguson been such a part of the AEC as to be essential to
functioning, they would have enjoyed the same immunity as the AEC itself.80
From the above discussion, the following factors emerge as guidelines for
determining whether a particular activity is essential to the function of some
facet of the Government: (1) the extent of government regulation; (2) extent
of government control; (3) existence of congressional charter; (4) government
subsidization; (5) private ownership and profit-making activity;8 7 and (6)
government reliance on the services of the particular activity.
The instant court emphasized the change in character and functions of the
national banks-from entities primarily serving the needs of the Government
to corporations serving, primarily and predominantly, the interests of their
private shareholders. The advent of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, four-
teen years after Owensboro,38 brought a substantial change to the character and
function of the national banks. Like the Red Cross and the post exchanges, they
are, however, regulated extensively by Congress.89 The control and the adminis-
35. Id. at 47-48.
36. Id.
37. There is no doubt that the private profit-making nature of the government contrac-
tors detracts from their claim to tax immunity. See United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 45
(1964) ; United States v. Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486 (1958) ; United States v. Detroit, 355
U.S. 466, 474 (1958). The instant court placed considerable importance upon the fact that
the national banks are profit-making enterprises. - Mass. -, 229 N.E.2d at 252-53. However,
the Supreme Court noted in Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. at 485, that the post
exchanges sometimes make profits which go to the troops and this did not prevent the
Court's finding that the post exchanges are immune. Also, the fact that the Red Cross is
essentially a privately operated institution in that its employees do not work for the
Government and that Government officials do not direct its everyday affairs did not lead
the Court to declare that the Red Cross is not immune. Department of Employment v.
United States, 385 U.S. 355, 360 (1966).
38. The Owensboro case was decided when the status of the national banks was
governed solely by The National Bank Act. Act of June 3, 1864, 13 Stat. 99. This act
provided for a national currency, secured by a pledge of United States Bonds, and authorized
the establishment of national banks. Act of June 3, 1864, § 5, 13 Stat. 99. The national banks
were to be used as depositories and as financial agents of the Government in carrying out the
nation's fiscal policies. Act of June 3, 1864, § 45, 13 Stat. 113. With the enactment of the
Federal Reserve System in 1913, the national banks' role as fiscal agents was reduced. A special
report for the New York Tax Commission said the following: "Today national banks play
but an insignificant role in the guise of federal instrumentalities. The duty of providing a
sound currency has devolved almost entirely upon the Federal Reserve Banks .... National
banks are now hardly more a federal instrumentality than railroads and steamships and
airlines that carry mails or any other private concern which enters into contracts for the
performance of government services. Their only important claim to distinction from state
member banks is their compulsory membership in the Federal Reserve System." New York
Tax Commission, Special Report No. 7, Welch, State and Local Taxation of Banks in The
United States 209-10 (1934).
39. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.2 (1967). See also United States v. Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486
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tration of the national banks is under the supervision of the Comptroller of
Currency who is the head of the Bureau of Comptroller, a division of the
Treasury Department,40 and, of course, the national banks are chartered by
Congress.41 The greatest single basis for the tax immunity of the national
banks, however, is their essential role in the Federal Reserve System which is
the nation's means of stabilizing the currency. Though the System consists of
privately owned member banks,4 control of the System is lodged in the Board
of Governors appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. The
Federal Reserve System's purpose is to foster a flow of credit and money which
is designed to facilitate the economic growth of the nation. This is done through
the member banks, primarily by means of the System's control over the re-
serve positions of the member banks. It is these reserves which determine how
the member banks extend credit. The System's control of credit is a crucial fac-
tor in controlling the rate of economic growth. 43 Thus, there is substance to the
argument that the national banks, as the only mandatory members of the
Federal Reserve System, are indispensable vehicles for carrying out the
nation's fiscal policy.
The instant court wrote off as dictum the statement of Mr. Justice Fortas in
the Red Cross case that "the Red Cross is like other institutions--e.g., national
banks-whose status as tax-immune instrumentalities of the United States is
beyond dispute." 44 The court's ignoring the Fortas dictum is certainly question-
able. Though it be merely dictum, it is one which has behind it one hundred-
fifty years of judicial consensus and an invariable practice of exemption of
national banks from state taxation. Despite the growing similarities between
national and state banks, especially those state banks which are members of
the Federal Reserve System, taxation of the national banks has traditionally
been a matter of congressional concern. Altering the methods of taxing them is
not the proper function of the courts, but a matter for Congress to consider.
Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Specific Warnings of Fourth
Amendment Rights Held Not Necessary to Validate Consensual Search
After Suspect Has Been Given ,Mirada Warnings.-The defendant was
arrested by New York narcotics agents in 1964. He was taken to a police station
where he was advised of his right to counsel. Later he was interviewed by an
FBI agent who advised "him of his right to remain silent, to call an attorney,
(1958) (regulation by the Government indicates assimilation by the Government for the
purposes of tax immunity).
40. 12 US.C. § 1 (1964).
41. The national banks were established by Congress in 1863 by the National Bank Act,
13 Stat. 99, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
42. All national banks are required to be members of the Federal Reserve System. 12
U.S.C. § 222 (1964).
43. The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions 4, 8-10, 20 (1963).
44. 385 U.S. at 360.
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to have an attorney provided for him if he could not afford one, and of the
fact that anything said might be held against him."' At this time he was sus-
pected of being involved in a Rhode Island bank robbery. The FBI agent, see-
ing a motel receipt in defendant's possession, asked him if he had any objection
to his room being searched, and the defendant replied "'Go ahead; look in the
room.' "2 In the room evidence was found connecting him with the robbery. The
defendant was convicted and appealed on the ground that the search of the
motel room violated his rights under the fourth amendment.3 The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the conviction and held that the defendant
had "consented" to the search. Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (1st
Cir. 1967).
The court relied on Johnson v. Zerbst,4 the leading case on waiver of consti-
tutional rights, for the proposition that the "consent must be seen to be an
'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.' "5 Subsequent
cases have held that consent must be "'unequivocal, specific and intelligently
given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion ... ,' "0 and that the govern-
ment bears a heavy burden of proving voluntariness.1 The court rejected the
suggestion that by analogy to Miranda v. Arizona8 a specific warning of fourth
amendment rights was required to validate a warrantless search after a suspect
has been arrested and given the Miranda warnings. 9
The instant court reasoned that a suspect who has been warned of his right
to remain silent and has been told that anything he might say can be used
against him has been sufficiently warned of his right to refuse to consent to a
search. In effect the court is saying that by giving the warning set forth in
Miranda, the police have complied with Zerbst. The defendant, therefore, has
been given enough knowledge to make a knowing waiver of his rights, and the
need for a specific fourth amendment warning has been obviated.
The court stated that there was no analogy between Miranda and the fourth
amendment, since the differences in the underlying rules governing search and
seizure and those governing self-incrimination are too great.10 The Miranda
1. Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158, 161 (1st Cir. 1967).
2. Id.
3. U.S. Const. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... .
4. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
5. 380 F.2d 158, 163 (1st Cir. 1967).
6. Id.
7. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938); United States v. Page, 302 F.2d
81, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1962).
8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9. "We therefore see no reason in policy or precedent automatically to borrow a pro-
cedure adapted to one set of constitutional rights at one stage of a criminal proceeding and
apply it to a quite different right, serving quite different purposes, at another stage."




warnings are designed to exclude unreliable evidence, to protect against self-
incrimination and to insure that the suspect knows of his right to counsel."' The
court indicated that the restrictions on search, however, are designed only to
maintain "civilized standards of police practice"' 2 and concluded that Miranda
can have no application to the consensual search situation.
There are very few cases on the doctrine of "knowing waiver" in the consen-
sual search field. Though much mention has been made of this doctrine by the
courts, it has had little effect upon their decisions.' 3 In almost all cases that
quote the Zerbst definition of waiver of a constitutional right (the "knowing
waiver" doctrine) the element of prime import has not been lack of knowledge,
but coercion. Lack of knowledge of rights is generally passed over, or at most,
used as further proof of coercion."4 Recently, however, the courts have begun to
face the problem squarely.
In United States v. Blalock,' 5 a federal district court case in Pennsylvania, FBI
agents, who had long suspected the defendant of a bank robbery, met him in a
hotel lobby. There, without a warrant, they frisked him and obtained his per-
mission to search his room, where they found incriminating evidence. They did
not warn him of his fourth amendment rights. The court said that the consent did
not meet the "intelligent" standard of Zerbst because the defendant was not
informed of his rights' 6 and that the fourth amendment requires just as knowing
a waiver as the fifth and sixth. As one must be aware of one's rights to surrender
them, the court suggested that all police officers should inform the person to be
searched of his right to require a warrant.17 The Blalock case in effect held that
the knowing waiver of a constitutional right requires actual knowledge of that
right by the party waiving it.
This position is upheld in the case of United States v. Nikrasck, 18 decided in
the Seventh Circuit. Here the defendant was arrested while driving late at
night. While he was detained in the stationhouse he consented to a search of his
car and false serial numbers were found on it. Later these were used as incrimi-
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 US. 826
(1966) ; Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1962) ; Channel v. United States,
285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
14. See Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 Colum. L.
Rev. 130, 133 (1967). Typical is Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965), in
which, after a long discussion citing Zerbst, the defendant was held not to have waived her
rights, not because she didn't know them-which the court decided actually was the case-
but because she was coerced by the "'color of the badge.'" Id. at 98.
15. 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
16. "Certainly, one cannot intelligently surrender that which he does not know he has."
Id. at 269 (emphasis deleted).
17. "To require law enforcement agents to advise the subjects of investigation of their
right to insist on a search warrant would impose no great burden .... " Id. at 269-70.
18. 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966).
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nating evidence against him. At no time was the defendant advised of his right
to resist a warrantless search. The court held that as he had not been so advised,
true consent to the search had not been given.19
Recently the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court
decision that held that a defendant's consent to a search was not knowing or
intelligent, and hence void, because he had not been advised of his right to
resist a warrantless search.20
It would seem that in the instant case the defendant had not made a knowing
waiver of his fourth amendment right. The court has, in effect, held that when
the Miranda warnings were given, the defendant received constructive knowledge
of his right to resist a search. Contrary to the cases discussed above, the instant
court implies that actual knowledge of one's rights is not necessary to make a
valid waiver of them. The instant court seems to back away from the rigid stan-
dard set in the Zerbst case2 '-a standard that has been upheld in many other
instances.22
The "knowing waiver" doctrine sets up the basic requirement for the waiver
of any constitutional right: "an intentional relinquishment ... of a known right
or privilege."'23 Later cases have held, moreover, that a "knowing waiver" re-
quires actual knowledge of the right to be waived. Perhaps Miranda sets new
standards of knowledge for a "knowledgeable waiver." For such a waiver to
exist in respect to the fifth and sixth amendments, the Supreme Court has held,
the suspect must be informed not only of his right to be silent, but also that any-
thing he says can be used against him, that he has a right to a lawyer and that
one will be provided for him if he cannot afford one. 24 These elements interlock
"to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of
foregoing it. It is only through an awareness [actual knowledge] of these conse-
quences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent
exercise [or waiver] of the privilege."2 5 The Zerbst "knowing waiver" doctrine
requires that actual knowledge is necessary for valid waiver of a right. Miranda,
19. Id. at 744.
20. Gladden v. Pogue, 384 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1967).
21. "But that things which might be found in a search could be used against an accused
seems implicit in the warning of the right to remain silent .... " Gorman v. Unlted States,
380 F.2d 158, 164 (1st Cir. 1967).
"[Wihen the accused is directly asked whether he objects to the search, there must be at
least some suggestion that his objection is significant or that the search waits upon his
consent. When this is combined with a warning of his right to be silent, and his right to
counsel, which would seem in the circumstances to put him on notice that he can refuse to
cooperate, we think it fair to infer that his purported consent is in fact voluntary." Id. at
163-64.
22. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Wren v. United States, 352 F.2d
617 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 944 (1966); United States ex rel. Mancini v.
Rundle, 337 F.2d 268 (3d Cir. 1964) ; Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir, 1960).
23. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
24. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
25. Id. at 469.
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in addition to actual knowledge, requires that a rigid set of warnings be delivered
to ensure uniformity of police practice. Reading Zerbst and Miranda together,
one could argue that the defendant was entitled to a specific warning of his
fourth amendment right to resist a search. Only with such a warning would the
defendant be given enough knowledge not only to know of the right, but also to
know of the consequences of foregoing it, as the Miranda standard of knowledge
requires. In any cases, the defendant in the instant case was at least entitled to
his rights under Zerbst, and these were denied. The instant court's use of a
Miranda fifth and sixth amendment warning to give the suspect constructive
knowledge of his fourth amendment rights cannot be sufficient for Zerbst. A
mere warning of the suspect's right to insist upon a warrant may not be sufficient
either because such a warning does not ensure that the suspect knows all of his
courses of action and their consequences.2 6
Since the instant case involved a consent search a further basis for the appli-
cation of Miranda exists. Courts have most often considered coercion to be the
prime element that invalidates consent to a search. A custodial consent gives
rise to a strong presumption that any information or waiver obtained from a
suspect has been coerced 2 7 Even where a party is not under arrest, but only
being questioned in a public place, the courts have said that any consent ob-
tained was obtained "under color of the badge"28 and was presumptively co-
erced. Before Miranda, courts had implied that the presence of a peace officer
is prima facie evidence of coercion.2 9 As it is only prima facie evidence, however,
if no warning has been given, this presumption can be rebutted by other evidence
of surrounding circumstances. According to Miranda, however, one element of
compulsion is lack of knowledge of one's rights.30 If no warning is given, then,
there exists not prima facie, but conclusive evidence of compulsion. A warning,
then, is necessary, for only through that means can the suspect be ensured of
having actual knowledge of his rights (of course, it would have to be a Zerbst
warning at the very least).
Arguably, the instant court's rejection of the analogy between Miranda and
the fourth amendment was unsound.31 The court reasoned that Miranda deals
only with compulsory self-incrimination and that there can be no analogy with
the fourth amendment which deals with the sanctity of the home and personal
possessions. Furthermore, the essential element of the fifth amendment is com-
pulsion, while that of the fourth is unreasonableness.
26. For a model of such a warning see Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After
Miranlda v. Arizona, supra note 14, at 158.
27. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). "Non-resistance to the orders or sugges-
tions of the police is not infrequent in such a situation; true consent, free of fear or pressure,
is not so readily to be found." Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
28. United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1962).
29. See generally id. o
30. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465-67 (1966).
31. The Kansas Supreme Court has likewise rejected any such analogy. State v. McCarty,
199 Kan. 116, 427 P.2d 616 (1967).
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It should be noted that when Zerbst was decided, it applied only to the sixth
amendment, but its general definition of waiver was later applied to the fourth.
Perhaps Miranda, which also sets forth a general standard of waiver for the
sixth, as well as the fifth amendment will be similarly extended. Another argu-
ment for Miranda's extension is that consent to a search may be considered a
form of self-incrimination. 32 Historically, too, a close connection has been made
by the Court between the fourth and fifth amendments. The fields they are
meant to protect are similar-person and property, and privacy-and may quite
logically be viewed as different aspects of the same problem.
Domestic Relations-Mexican Law Applied on Effect of Mexican Bilateral
Divorce Decree Upon Alimony and Support Provisions of a Prior New
York Separation Decree.-Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1948.
In 1964 the plaintiff, Mrs. Lappert, obtained a New York separation, which
included certain alimony and support provisions. The defendant, Mr. Lappert,
also stipulated upon the court record that the requirements for alimony and
support should not be affected by a subsequent divorce decree. Mrs. Lappert
thereafter obtained a bilateral Mexican divorce decree which "incorporated the
separation agreement and provided that it did not merge in the decree, but
survived it."' Two years later, in July, 1966 her husband moved to modify the
judgement of separation by deleting the alimony and support provisions of the
separation agreement "on the ground that the divorce decree overrides them."2
In the supreme court, trial term, the husband's motion was granted.8 The appel-
late division reversed, certifying to the court of appeals the question of whether
its order was properly made.4 The court of appeals affirmed, applying the same
rule it would have followed had the divorce been granted in a sister state, ex-
tended the rule of Lynn v. Lynn5 and recognized the effect of the Mexican decree
upon the alimony provisions of the prior New York separation agreement. Lap-
pert v. Lappert, 20 N.Y.2d 364, 229 N.E.2d 599, 283 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1967).
Although required to afford full faith and credit to divorce decrees granted by
sister states having proper jurisdiction,( New York is free to deny recognition
32. See Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 14,
at 134.
33. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) ; Note, Consent Searches: A Reappralsal
After Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 14, at 134.
1. Lappert v. Lappert, 20 N.Y.2d 364, 366, 229 N.E.2d 599, 600, 283 N.Y.S.2d 26, 28 (1967).
2. Id. at 367, 229 N.E.2d at 600, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
3. Order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, October 18, 1966. 27 App. Div. 2d 559,
276 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (2d Dep't 1966). (
4. Id., 276 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
5. 302 N.Y. 193, 97 N.E.2d 748, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951).
6. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. See generally Reese and Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith
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of the decrees of any foreign nation.7 Generally, notions of comity8 govern the
willingness of a state court to recognize a divorce decree of a foreign nation.
The basic criterion by which these decrees are judged is whether "'they . . .
contravene our public policy.'-9 In deciding whether to recognize a foreign
divorce decree, the most critical aspect of the foreign law a state will scrutinize
is its requirement for jurisdiction over both the marital res and the "persons"
of the parties.10
The New York Court of Appeals, in Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel,n decided to
recognize Mexican bilateral divorces where " 'residence' has been acquired by
one party through a statutory formality based on brief contact." 12 The Rosen-
stiel court reasoned that the contacts required by Me~xcan law to give its
courts jurisdiction over the marital res' 3 were in effect no different from the
six week residency requirement of Nevada, whose divorces New York is bound
to recognize under full faith and credit 4 and, apparently, that Mexico's "sub-
stantive" grounds for divorce were no longer contrary to the public policy of
New York.15 A question remained, however, concerning the recognition the
and Credit to judgements, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 153 (1949); von Mfebren, The Validity of
Foreign Divorces, 45 Mass. L.Q. 23 (1960).
7. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). See also Martens v. Martens, 284 N.Y.
363, 365, 31 N.E.2d 489, 490 (1940).
8. "'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its
own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
9. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 375, 130 N.E.2d 902, 903 (1955) (citation
omitted).
10. See Nussbaum, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgements, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 221, 223
(1941).
11. 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965).
12. Id. at 71, 209 N.E2d at 711, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
13. Here proof of residence of a party was established by the mere signing of the
Municipal Register. Id. at 70, 209 N.E.2d at 710, 262 N.YS.2d at 88. See 51 Cornell L.Q.
328 n.4 (1965). For general discussion of Mexican divorce law see Comment, Mexican
Divorce-A Survey, 33 Fordham L. Rev. 449, 462 (1965).
14. 16 N.Y.2d at 73, 209 N.E.2d at 712, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
15. Id. at 74, 209 N.E.2d at 713, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 91. The dissent in Wood v. Wood,
which was decided along with Rosenstiel, protested that recognition of the Mexican "con-
sent" divorce (based on "incompatibility and ill treatment") was indeed offensive to New
York's public policy. It cited the legislative pronouncements (before September 1, 1967 the
sole ground for divorce in New York was adultery) and decisions of the state's highest
court as indicative of the state's concern for the "traditionally solemn nature of the
marriage contract.... " Id. at 86, 209 N.E.2d at 720, 262 N.YS.2d at 101. Fundamental
to this concern has been the notion that the state itself has an interest in preserving
marriages, and that parties may not dissolve them at will: "A husband and wife cannot
contract to alter or dissolve the marriage. . .. " N.Y. Gen. Ohl. Law § 5-311. While
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New York courts would grant to Mexican decrees concerning the respective
personal rights of the parties which had been altered. The doctrine of "divisible
divorce"'16 establishes that the dissolution of a marriage itself must be distin-
guished from the "legal and economic incidents"' 7 or personal rights of the
parties which spring from the marriage that has been dissolved.' 8 The precise
problem before the instant court was whether it should follow Mexican law
governing the effect of a Mexican divorce decree upon alimony provisions of a
prior New York separation agreement. If the divorce had been granted in a
sister state, New York would have applied the rule established in Lynn v. Lynn'0
that the law of that sister state will prevail as to the overriding effect of its
divorce.20 The instant court, while acknowledging that it was free to ignore
the rule of Lynn v. Lynn where a foreign divorce was involved, 21 nevertheless
stated that such a decision would be inconsistent with the reasoning contained
in Rosenstiel.22 Since Rosenstiel had established that Mexico's requirement for
Rosenstiel has been accused of recognizing a foreign decree which is contrary to the
public policy of New York, "without pretense of constitutional compulsion" (Currie,
Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 26, 57 (1966)), it nevertheless still stands for the proposition that Ncw York will
not recognize Mexican law unless "[it] offends no public policy of this state." 16 N.Y.2d at
74, 209 N.E.2d at 713, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 91. The indication in Rosenstiel that New York's
public policy had in fact become more liberal than the dissent would allow has recently
been confirmed by New York's new divorce law. Grounds for divorce now include cruelty,
abandonment, confinement to prison, adultery, as well as living apart pursuant to either
a decree of separation or a written separation agreement. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170
(Supp. 1967).
16. See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541
(1948).
17. Baylek v. Baylek, 25 Misc. 2d 391, 392, 206 N.Y.S.2d 359, 361 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
"Legal and economic incidents" would include rights of the parties regarding, e.g., alimony,
custody and support of children, and the permissibility of collateral attacks on foreign
divorce decrees.
18. See generally Herzog, Conflict of Laws, 17 Syracuse L. Rev. 139, 143-47 (1965).
19. 302 N.Y. 193, 97 N.E.2d 748, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951).
20. In Lynn v. Lynn, plaintiff and defendant were separated in New York by a decree
also providing for the wife's support. The husband subsequently obtained a bilateral divorce
in Nevada which did not award alimony. When plaintiff wife later sought an increase in the
support payments ordered in the original decree, the New York Court of Appeals held that,
as the Nevada court had personal jurisdiction over the parties, full faith and credit
required recognition of Nevada law on the effect of its divorce decree upon alimony awarded
in the New York separation decree. Since the Nevada divorce made no provision for alimony,
the wife was no longer entitled to support. It is significant to note that while New York
here recognized the law of Nevada, i.e., that "no right of support can survive except as
awarded by the final decree of divorce or by an authorized amendment to such decree"
(302 N.Y. at 203, 97 N.E.2d at 753 (citations omitted)), New York law, along with "the
general current of authority," was the same as that of Nevada. Id., 97 N.E.2d at 753
(citations omitted).
21. 20 N.Y.2d at 368, 229 N.E.2d at 601, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
22. Id., 229 N.E.2d at 601, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
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jurisdiction in a divorce action was no longer offensive to public policy, the
Lappert court saw no reason to refuse to apply to the Mexican divorce the same
rule that applies to decrees of sister states governing the effect of its divorces
upon prior alimony awards.23
Arguably, the instant court's extension of Lynn v. Lynn to Mexican bilateral
divorces portends the application of Mexican law by the New York courts on
the effect of Mexican divorce decrees upon alimony provisions of any prior New
York separation agreement. Further, it would be consistent to assume that in
the future New York will extend the same basic conflict of laws principles to
other adjudications of Mexican courts governing the respective personal rights
of parties to a divorce.
The more recently decided case of Schoenbrod v. Sieglcr2 4 seems to support
such a conclusion. This case involved the related question of when New York
will allow a collateral attack upon a Mexican divorce. Plaintiff and defendant
were married in the West Indies in 1963. Plaintiff thereafter obtained a Mexican
bilateral divorce, which incorporated a separation agreement entered into by
the parties just prior to the divorce. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff learned that
the marriage ceremony allegedly solemnized in Granada, West Indies was per-
formed by a public official unauthorized under the laws of that jurisdiction to
solemnize a marriage. He then instituted an action in New York to declare the
marriage void and to set aside the separation agreement on the ground that
the parties were never married. The supreme court denied the motion of the
divorced wife to dismiss the complaint.25 The appellate division reversed and
held that the prior bilateral Mexican divorce decree approving the separation
agreement was res judicata on the issue of the validity of the marriage.20 The di-
vorced husband appealed to the court of appeals. Since Mexican courts lacked
the "jurisdiction or power to vacate their own divorce decrees for any reason
at all," the court reasoned, the only way the plaintiff could obtain the relief
sought was by way of a collateral attack on the judgement.27 The court of
appeals, in reversing the appellate division, held that "[slince the rendering
nation would permit such an attack.., plaintiff 'may collaterally attack [the
decree] in our courts' and litigate the validity of the marriage which the divorce
purportedly terminated."2 8
While New York will allow collateral attacks upon a sister state's bilateral
23. Though the Lappert court decided to follow Mexico's law, since it was not briefed
on the appeal, the court consequently assumed it to be the same as New York's which it
applied. It then held that where a husband in a separation action commenced by his wife
stipulated on record that required alimony and support payments should not be affected by
any decree of divorce, he freely waives (is estopped from maintaining) his right to assert
the overriding effect of a subsequent Mexican divorce decree concerning such provisions of
the separation judgement. Id. at 369, 229 N.E.2d at 602, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
24. 20 N.Y.2d 403, 230 N.E.2d at 638, 283 N.YS.2d 881 (1967).
25. Schoenbrod v. Siegler, 50 Misc. 2d 202, 270 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
26. 27 App. Div. 2d 531, 275 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1st Dep't 1966) (per curiam).
27. 20 N.Y.2d at 409, 230 N.E.2d at 641, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 885 (1967).
28. Id., 230 N.E.2d at 641, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 885 (citations omitted).
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divorce decrees only if the law of that sister state would permit such an
attack,29 it is naturally free to ignore this rule in regard to collateral attacks on
Mexican decrees. 30 The court was moved basically by the same principles which
motivated the court in Rosenstiel to recognize the Mexican bilateral divorce,
and in Lappert to recognize Mexican law on the priority of its divorce decree
over a prior separation agreement. Both cases were guided by the general
proposition that New York will recognize Mexican law if it does not offend its
public policy. Since Mexican bilateral divorces were no longer offensive to the
public policy of New York, there appeared to be no objection to extending the
rule governing permissibility of collateral attacks upon a sister state divorce to
the Mexican divorce as well. Before deciding to recognize Mexico's law, how-
ever, the court did first determine that the law of New York would allow a
collateral attack under similar circumstances. Though the majority in the
appellate division were of the opinion that New York law would not permit
such a collateral attack "'under constraint of Statter v. Statter,' "31 the court
of appeals found a significant distinction between the two cases. In Statler, one
essential fact motivating the court's finding that a New York separation decree
was res judicata on the issue of the validity of the marriage was that "relief
from the earlier judgement of separation was available 'by way of motion in
the first proceeding .... , ,,2 While a party in New York may obtain relief from
a judgement on the ground of newly discovered evidence,3 Mexican courts have
neither the jurisdiction nor the power to vacate their own divorce decrees. It
follows, then, that New York law would allow a collateral attack upon a divorce
decree rendered in a jurisdiction where such direct relief was not available to a
party. Having established that New York and Mexican law would both allow
the husband's collateral attack,3 4 the court decided to apply the same rule
29. See Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
30. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
31. Schoenbrod v. Siegler, 20 N.Y.2d 403, 407, 230 N.E.2d 638, 640, 283 N.Y.S.2d 881,
884 (1967). Statter v. Statter, 2 N.Y.2d 668, 143 N.E.2d 10, 163 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1957), held
that since an action for separation could be maintained only "'by a husband or wife against
the other party to the marriage'" the existence of a valid marriage is "a condition precedent
to the successful maintenance of a cause for separation," and thus "a judgement of separa-
tion establishes [res judicata) the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between
the parties . . . . " Id. at 672, 143 N.E.2d at 12, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 16 (citations omitted).
There the majority in invoking the doctrine of res judicata, stated that "[plerhaps the
most relevant factor here is the law's desire to secure stability and consistency of judicial
determinations." Id. at 674-75, 143 N.E.2d at 13-14, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 18. The dissent pro-
tested that the majority misapplied res judicata to this case since the existence of a valid
marriage between plaintiff and defendant had never actually been tried in the earlier sep-
aration suit. It felt that proper public policy would value the notion that "the marriage
status is not to be altered by consent or default directly or indirectly . . . . " more highly
than the "need for finality in litigation." Id. at 676, 143 N.E.2d at 15, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 20
(citations omitted).
32. 20 N.Y.2d at 408, 230 N.E.2d at 641, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
33. N.Y. C.PJL.R. § 5015(a)(2).
34. Judge Burke in his dissenting opinion questioned whether in fact Mexican law does
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governing the permissibility of collateral attacks on sister state decrees and
allowed the collateral attack "[s]ince the rendering nation would permit such
an attack .... 1135
With Rosenstiel opening the door to the Mexican "suitcase divorce, "30 and the
Lappert and Schoenbrod decisions clearly reflecting the willingness of New
York to recognize Mexican law governing the subsequent rights of the parties,
the courts may be tested more frequently on just how far they will go in
recognizing Mexican law on all issues related to the bilateral divorce. Though
the Lappert and Sckoenbrod decisions indicate that New York, while not com-
pelled by full faith and credit, will in fact grant Mexican law governing rights
of parties to Mexican divorces the same effect as that of New York's sister
states, it must be remembered that such recognition is still discretionary and
may be withheld if New York's public policy is offended. One specific area
where New York would certainly refuse to apply its "normal" conflict of laws
principles 37 to a Mexican decree is in the area of divorced parties' custody
rights.38 Principles of comity will often dictate that a foreign jurisdiction's
permit such a collateral attack. He felt that the appellant failed to make "an adequate
showing of the availability in Mfexico of a remedy by way of 'collateral attack,"' relying
instead on an affidavit which did not "satisfy even the requirements of CPLR 4511 (subd.
[b]) that before a court shall be required to take judicial notice of the law of a foreign
country the party requesting such notice must 'furnish ... the court sufficient information
to enable it to comply with the request.'" 20 N.Y.2d at 411-12, 230 N.E.2d at 642-43, 283
N.Y.S.2d at 887 (dissenting opinion). Judge Van Voorhis, in a separate dissenting opinion,
stated that since the decree could not be collaterally attacked in New York or Mexico "by
reason of any other defect in the Mexican court's jurisdiction of the subject matter, the
collateral attack should not be allowed on the ground that there was no marriage to dissolve."
Id. at 410, 230 N.E2d at 641, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 886 (dissenting opinion).
35. Id. at 409, 230 NE.2d at 641, 283 N.YS.2d at 885.
36. See Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel and Borax,
34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 26 (1966).
37. New York courts usually apply principles of comity to foreign custodial decrees and
follow the law of the child's domicile. "A child's domicile is that of the parent to whose
custody it has legally been given . . . ." Application of Lang, 9 App. Div. 2d 401, 405, 193
N.Y.S2d 763, 767 (1st Dep't 1959) (citations omitted), afPd per curiam, 7 N.Y.2d 1029, 166
N.E.2d 861, 200 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1960). It is also established that "the mere physical presence
of a child in the State is sufficient to confer on its courts power to make effective disposition
for the child's welfare, including the determination of custody." Id. at 406, 193 N.Y.S.2d at
768. See also People v. Uzielli, 23 App. Div. 2d 260, 260 N.Y.S.2d 329 (Ist Dep't), aff'd
per curiam, 16 N.Y.2d 1057, 213 N.E.2d 460, 266 N.YS.2d 131 (1965).
38. In Rudnick v. Rudnick, 285 N.Y.S2d 996 (Family Ct. 1967), the court held that
where a Mexican divorce decree orders a father to make support payments for his child
which the New York court considers inadequate under the circumstances, the New York
court may withhold recognition of such provisions. "This court now holds that a foreign
country decree which provides for a child who is domiciled in and is a citizen of New York
State in an improvident and inadequate manner offends our public policy and is not
entitled to recognition in that respect." Id. at 1001. In Baylek v. Baylek, 25 Misc. 2d 391,
206 N.YS.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1960), the New York Supreme Court, relying on Lynn, decided
to recognize Mexican law on the effect of its divorce decree upon the custody provisions
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custody decree be upheld in New York. In this area, however, the welfare of
the children provides the "primary basis for judicial action,"80 and the courts
are free to withhold recognition of any foreign decree. Nevertheless, the court
in Application of Lang cautions that the power to "depart from principles of com-
ity does not mean that the power should be exercised in the absence of extraordi-
nary circumstances demonstrating that otherwise the children will suffer .... "40
With this one reservation, then,--that extraordinary circumstances of a particu-
lar case may offend some public policy of New York 4 1-it appears safe to
assume that Mexican adjudications governing subsequent rights of parties to
its divorces will be granted the same effect that would have been given to such
a decree had it been rendered by a sister state.
Torts--Conversion-Use of Information Contained in Stolen Documents
Held to Constitute a Conversion.-Two former employees and two persons
then employed by the plaintiff, a United States Senator, removed several thou-
sand documents from his offices. Before returning them, the employees made
copies which they later turned over to the defendant newspapermen. Defen-
dants, who were aware of the circumstances under which the copies were ob-
tained, reproduced in their newspaper column portions of the copies which they
had received and wrote articles for their column based on information contained
in the copies received. The District Court for the District of Columbia, on plain-
tiff's motion for summary judgment, found the defendants liable in conversion
but denied summary judgment on an invasion of privacy theory. The court held
that "a person who receives copies of documents that have been purloined from
another and uses the information contained in them, knowing that the originals
have been purloined, is liable for damages to their owner."' The issue of damages
was left for determination at trial. Dodd v. Pearson, No. 66 Civ. 1193 (D.D.C.,
Jan. 15, 1968).
The rights protected in a cause of action sounding in conversion have been
contained in a prior New York separation agreement but failed to discuss the question of
public policy.
39. Application of Lang, 9 App. Div. 2d at 403, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
40. Id. at 406, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 768 (citations omitted).
41. The New York Court of Appeals in a more recent decision failed to find certain
allegedly "offensive" provisions of a Mexican divorce decree repugnant to New York's
public policy. Gunter v. Gunter, 20 N.Y.2d 883, 232 N.E.2d 853, 285 N.Y.S.2d 855
(1967) (per curiam). Here plaintiff husband unsuccessfully tried to set aside a New York
separation agreement which had been incorporated in a Mexican divorce decree on the
ground that it was "contrary to public policy." The court of appeals rejected plaintiff's
contention that the incorporated separation agreement which included an arbitration clause
was "repugnant to Section 5-311 of the General Obligations Law," which forbids parties to
"contract to alter or dissolve a marriage." Id. at 856, 232 N.E.2d at 853, 285 N.Y.S.2d at
856. See note 15 supra.
1. Dodd v. Pearson, No. 66 Civ. 1193, at 1 (D.D.C., Jan. 15, 1968).
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gradually expanded. At first, conversion protected only those property rights
associated with possession of chattels.3 Thus, if a writing (which is a chattel)
was taken, the owner's property right in the writing was nominally protected by
an action for conversion to the extent of the price of the piece of paper itself.4
However, the conversion of a writing which symbolizes a chose in action often
effectively deprives its owner of an intangible interest beyond the value of the piece
of paper taken. In cases involving choses in action the courts have therefore held
that the intangible interest may be converted by taking a writing which symbol-
izes it.5 In such cases mere possession of the writing by the converter confers
upon him either rights inimical to those of the true owner or makes exercise of
the true owner's right so difficult that a conversion of the writing is deemed a
conversion of the underlying right.6 For example, when a bankbook is wrongfully
taken, in addition to the conversion of the bankbook itself, the money on deposit
in the bank is also converted because the right of the owner of the bank-
book to withdraw that money has been interfered with.7 It has even been held
that some intangible rights may be converted without converting the tangible
evidence of those rights.8 For example: X purchases shares of stock in C corpo-
ration from B, but C corporation wrongfully refuses to register the change in
ownership on its records. Although C corporation does not possess the stock
certificates, it is liable as a converter because it has deprived X of the right to
dividends, the right to sell the shares and other rights associated with ownership
of the shares.9
The instant court, recognizing that the plaintiff had been injured, stated that
if the employees who physically removed and copied the Senator's documents
were defendants in this case, they would be liable for damages in trespass and
conversion.10 However, the Senator's employees were not defendants in this case,
and their acts alone could not be used as a basis for imposing liability on the
2. Ames, The History of Trover, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 374, 386 (1898).
3. Comment, Conversion of Choses in Action, 10 Fordham L. Rev. 415 (1941).
4. Teall v. Felton, 1 N.Y. 537 (1848), affd, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1851) (newspaper
and wrapper) ; Clendon v. Dinneford, 5 Car. & P. 13, 172 Eng. Rep. 855 (K.B. 1831) (letters);
Earle v. Holderness, 4 Bing. 462, 130 Eng. Rep. (K.B. 1828) (letters).
5. E.g., Otten v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (bonds); United
States v. Michaelson, 58 F. Supp. 796 (D. Minn. 1945) (checks); Hamilton v. Hamilton,
255 Ala. 284, 51 So. 2d 13 (1951) (insurance policy) ; Plunkett-Jarrell Grocery Co. v. Terry,
222 Ark. 784, 263 S.W.2d 229 (1953) (account books); Teper v. Weiss, 115 Ga. App. 621,
155 S.E.2d 730 (1967) (notes); Iavazzo v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 51 R. 459, 155
A. 407 (1931) (savings bank book).
6. See generally Comment, Conversion of Choses in Action, supra note 3, at 416-22.
7. Stebbins v. North Adams Trust Co., 243 Mass. 69, 136 N.E. 880 (1922); lavazzo v.
Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 51 R.I. 459, 155 A. 407 (1931).
8. London, Paris & American Bank v. Aronstein, 117 F. 601 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
187 U.S. 641 (1902); Bond v. Mount Hope Iron Co., 99 Mlass. 505 (186S) ; Humphreys v.
Minnesota Clay Co., 94 Minn. 469, 103 N.W. 338 (1905).
9. Herrick v. Humphrey Hardware Co., 73 Neb. 809, 103 N.W. 685 (1905).
10. Dodd v. Pearson, No. 66 Civ. 1193, at 6 (D.D.C., Jan. 15, 196S).
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defendant columnists. Had the court found that the Senators' employees acted
as agents of the defendants, then the defendants would be liable as joint tort-
feasors." But the agency issue presents a question of fact,12 which could not be
resolved on the motion for summary judgment.' 3 Unable, therefore, to find that
the defendants were joint tortfeasors, the court found that defendants were
successive converters.' 4 "[A] person who [knowingly] receives and uses the
property of another that has been wrongfully obtained . is likewise guilty of
conversion and liable for damages." 5 Precisely what "property" does the court
mean that the defendants have converted? Since the defendants received only
copies and were never in possession of the Senator's original documents,10
clearly the defendants have not converted the papers which comprise the
plaintiff's original records.
If the court means that the defendants deprived the plaintiff of an under-
lying interest in the records (the information contained therein), then the case
is analogous to the shareholder case because the defendant has deprived plain-
tiff of an underlying interest without physically taking the tangible evidence
representing that interest. In the shareholder case the stock certificates were not
interfered with by the defendants; the corporation effected the conversion by
manipulating through the use of corporate control the rights represented by the
certificates.' 7 In the case at hand, the original documents were not interfered
with by the defendants;' 8 the defendants effected the conversion by knowingly
accepting copies of converted documents. In several criminal cases the federal
courts,' 9 as well as the New York Penal Law,2 0 have recognized that the con-
11. "The law is well established that all persons who instigate, command, encourage,
advise, ratify or condone the commission of a trespass are cotrespassers and, as such, are
jointly and severally liable as joint tortfeasors." Kapson v. Kubath, 165 F. Supp. 542,
551 (W. D. Mich. 1958). See also Christensen v. Frankland, 324 I11. App. 391, 58 N.E.2d
289 (1944); Oyler v. Fenner, 264 Mich. 519, 250 N.W. 296 (1933).
12. See Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Dodd v. Pearson, No. 66 Civ. 1193,
at 2 (D.D.C., Jan. 15, 1968), where reference is made to a previous motion for summary
judgment which was denied because "the affidavits of Pearson and Anderson raised a
genuine issue of fact as to whether defendants had induced . . . [the employees] to abstract
documents from plaintiff's files."
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides for granting summary judgment if "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact . .. ."
14. Dodd v. Pearson, No. 66 Civ. 1193, at 6 (D.D.C., Jan. 15, 1968).
15. Id.
16. Neither the allegations of the plaintiff nor the finding of the court indicates that the
instant defendants ever had possession of the original records of the plaintiff.
17. Herrick v. Humphrey Hardware Co., 73 Neb. 809, 811, 103 N.W. 685, 687 (1905).
18. This is assuming there was no agency relationship between the plaintiff's employees
and the defendants.
19. United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966)
(secret formulae) ; United States v. Lester, 282 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 937 (1961) (oil field map); United States v. Seagraves, 265 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1959)
(oil field map).
20. In 1967 New York adopted a new Penal Law which included a provision which
makes it a crime unlawfully to use secret scientific information. The section provides that
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tents of certain writings have value apart from the written expression and that
there is commercial value in keeping knowledge of the contents of secret scien-
tific writings limited to their rightful owner. When an owner's documents are
copied the owner may be deprived of the commercial value of keeping the
papers secret without being deprived of the original documents. Thus one may
steal a secret formula without actually taking the formula itself from the
owner.2 ' The well established federal doctrine which allows the maintenance of
a private suit for harm resulting from conduct in violation of a statute = has
not been applied to cases of this type. It is not unreasonable, however, to ex-
pect that the civil law will eventually parallel the penal law and allow conver-
sion to lie in cases of this type.23 But the instant plaintiff did not claim to have
been deprived of underlying rights in any way related to secret scientific infor-
mation. Although the plaintiff's records undoubtedly proved valuable to the
defendants, they did not contain the secret type of information2 4 which has
commercial value to their rightful owner. The plaintiff did not seek redress for
the type of underlying commercial injury which is ordinarily contemplated in
conversion. Rather, the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that his interest in
keeping personal information confidential was invaded.
Traditionally, one who complains that he has been injured in reputation and
has suffered mental anguish and personal embarrassment because undesirable
publicity has been given to his affairs may recover under the theories of libelP
or invasion of privacy.2 However, a United States Senator is a public official
who derives his powers from the people who elect him as their representative. "-
Because the ultimate power in our society is derived from the people,28 the
first amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right to discuss, debate
and criticize the conduct of public officials.29 It has therefore been necessary
one is guilty of a class E felony if one "makes a tangible reproduction or representation of
such secret scientific material by means of writing, photographing, drawing, mechanically
or electronically reproducing or recording such secret scientific material." N.Y. Pen. L.
§ 165.07.
21. See note 19 supra.
22. E.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (violation of the Securities
Exchange Act); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 US. 33 (1916) (violation of the Federal
Safety Appliance Act).
23. Thus if a plaintiff can prove that property of the value of $5,000 or more was
stolen by copying it in some manner and that the property was transported across state
lines, there is a strong possibility that a federal court will allow a recovery in conversion,
even if the property is of a type never before protected in conversion.
24. The Senator claimed that the information consisted of financial records, tax returns,
books of account, cancelled checks and stubs and private correspondence.
25. See generally W. Prosser, Torts § 108, at 785 (3d ed. 1964).
26. Id. § 112, at 834-37.
27. U.S. Const. amend. XVII.
28. See A. Mleiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People
(1948).
29. "[Tlhe controversy over seditious libel [is] the clue to 'the central meaning of the
First Amendment.' ... The Amendment has a 'central meaning'-a core of protection of
speech without which democracy cannot function, without which, in Madison's phrase,
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to limit a public official's right to recover in privacy and libel. Although a
public official may have a cause of action for invasion of privacy concerning
publicity given to intimate aspects of his private life,80 a public official has
no cause of action for invasion of privacy concerning publicity given to the
public aspects of his life.31 Similarly, since the landmark case of New York
Times v. Sullivan,32 a public official who is defamed in his public capacity,""
cannot recover "unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." 34 A public official, who has not had his personal
life invaded by unwanted publicityas and who is unwilling or unable to prove
malice or a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the publication,80
should not be allowed to recover in conversion for injury to reputation and
thereby to circumvent the constitutional safeguards deemed necessary to pro-
tect the first amendment rights of free speech and a free press. If the publica-
tion of information gleaned from "converted" documents is to be made action-
able in conversion, then the constitutional safeguards deemed necessary to
protect first amendment freedoms in defamation and privacy actions should like-
wise be made applicable to these "conversion" actions.
'the censorial power' would be in the Government over the people and not 'in the people
over the Government.'" Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 The Supreme Court Review 191, 208.
30. W. Prosser, Torts § 112, at 849 (3d ed. 1964). See generally Spiegel, Public Celebrity
v. Scandal Magazine-The Celebrity's Right to Privacy, 30 S. Cal. L. Rev. 280 (1957).
31. Estill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 186 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir. 1951) (published photograph
linking public prosecutor with "Baby Face" Dillinger); Martin v. Dorton, 210 Miss. 668, 50
So. 2d 391 (1951) (photograph of sheriff while on duty); Hull v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644 (1956) (dictum) (photograph of a policeman on duty).
32. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
33. Id. at 279.
34. Id. at 279-80.
35. See note 31 supra.
36. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), reversed a libel judgment in favor of a
supervisor of a county recreation area and remanded to determine if plaintiff was a public
official within the Times doctrine and, if so, to allow him an opportunity to prove malice.
The Court reversed a criminal sedition conviction in Garrison v. Louisana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964), because the Times rule makes only those false statements made with a high degree
of awareness of their probable falsity the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions. Id. at
74-75. Another court dismissed a libel suit brought by a congressman for failure to comply
with the Times rule. Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1011 (1967).
